制度論在過去十來年在社會科學上取得重要的影響力，正當人們考量其他途徑的競爭性時，制度學派也逐漸擴大營業內容。不諱言的，制度論社群的網路外部性迫使其他途徑與之對話，然而，制度論的肥大化也使得大家各說各話。各說各話沒有什麼不好，對不上焦，討論起來就累。一般而言，制度論的討論墮性的出現，原因之一是制度論的討論途徑殊異，拜的神主牌不同，不同教派相互攻訐；原因之二是制度作為分析的對象與分析的途徑呈現小寫與大寫的理論之異，台灣的研究者常不辨其異，率爾挪用，機械化的套用概念，自然也使經院之學與街市之景出現扞格之處。1 – Introductory Class. Jan 18.
No assigned readings
2 – Different Approaches to Institutions. Jan 26
Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies. 1996; 44:936-957.
Katznelson, Ira and Weingast, Barry R. Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. in Katznelson, Ira and Weingast, Barry, eds. Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. New York: Russell Sage; 2005; pp. 1-26.
DiMaggio, Paul. The New Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1998; 154(4):697-705.
Adcock, Robert, Bevir, Mark and Stimson, Shannon. Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s). in Adcock, Robert and Bevir, Mark and Stimson, Shannon. Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 2007.
3- Rational Choice Theories of Institutions I – Institutions, Cycling and Stability of Choice (Organization of Congress) February 1.
Diermeier, Daniel and Krehbiel, Keith. Institutionalism as a Methodology, Stanford University Press Research Papers, 2001, available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/diermeier.pdf.
Schofield, Norman. Democratic Stability. in: Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science. 1979; 23( 1):27-59.
Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. 1988. Journal of Political Economy 96( 1):132-163.
Riker, William H. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review. 1980; 72( 2):432-446.
4 – Rational Choice Theories of Institutions II – Institutional Origins and Change (Economic Development in the Americas). February 8.
Knight, Jack. “Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change. In Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1995.
North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990. Chapter selections
Greif, Avner and David Laitin. “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.” American Political Science Review. 2004; 98:633-652.
Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Engerman, Stanley. Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2000; 14(3):217-232.
de Soto, Hernando The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. 2000. Chapter selection.
5 – Rational Choice Theories of Institutions III – Institutional Consequences (institutions and theories of trust and cooperation). February 15.
Milgrom, Paul R.; North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics. 1990; 2(1):1-23.
Miller, Gary J. Monitoring, Rules, and the Control Paradox: Can the Good Soldier Svejk be Trusted? in: Kramer, Roderick M. and Cook, Karen S., eds. Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Dilemmas and Approaches. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2004.
Calvert, Randall L. Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions. in: Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1995.
Levi, Margaret. A State of Trust. in: Braithwaite, Valerie and Levi, Margaret, eds. Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 1998; pp. 77-101.
Farrell, Henry and Knight, Jack. Trust and Institutional Compliance. Unpublished paper. 2007.
6 – Historical Institutionalism I – Macro-Institutions (Society and the State). February 22.
Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. in: Steinmo, Sven and Thelen, Kathleen, eds. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1992.
Katznelson, Ira. Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics. in: Lichbach, Mark I. and Zuckerman, Alan S., eds. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997.
Skocpol, Theda. Doubly Engaged Social Science: The Promise of Comparative Historical Analysis. in: Mahoney, James and Rueschmeyer, Dietrich, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2003.
Hall, Peter A. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1986. Chapter selection.
Tilly, Charles. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. in: Evans, Peter B.; Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985.
7 – Historical Institutions II – The Politics of Path Dependence (Varieties of Capitalism). March 1.
Arthur, W. Brian. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1994. Chapter Selection.
Pierson, Paul. Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review. 2000; 33, 6/7:251-67.
Mahoney, James. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society. 2000; 29(4):507-548.
Hall and Soskice. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000. Chapter One.
Crouch Colin and Farrell, Henry. Breaking the Path of Institutional Development: Alternatives to the New Determinism in Political Economy. Rationality and Society. 2004; 16(1):5-43
8 – Historical Institutionalism III: Beyond Path Dependence: Identifying Specific Mechanisms of Historical Institutional Change (The Welfare State). March 8.
Pierson, Paul. The New Politics of the Welfare State. World Politics. 1996; 48:143-79.
Hacker, Jacob S. Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment. in: Streeck, Wolfgang and Thelen, Kathleen, eds. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005.
Thelen, Kathleen. How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis. in: Mahoney, James and Dueschemeyer, Dietrich, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2002.
Huber, Evelyn and Stephens, John. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001. Chapter Selection.
9- Ideational and Sociological Accounts of Institutions I (Political Sociology of The European Union). March 22.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. 1989. New York: Free Press. Chapter One.
Olsen, Johan P. “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” ARENA Working Paper 01/02 available at http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm (also published in the Journal of Common Market Studies).
Neil Fligstein and Alec Stone Sweet. Constructing Markets and Politics: An Institutionalist Account of European Integration. American Journal of Sociology. 2002. 107:1206-43.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55:47-80. 2001.
Kathleen McNamara, “Where Do Rules Come From?: The Creation of the European Central Bank.” In Stone-Sweet, Alec and Wayne Sandholtz eds., The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford University Press 2001).
10 – Ideational and Sociological Accounts II (Economic Ideas in the US and Europe). March 29.
Berman, Sheri. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Ideological Dynamics of the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Chapter Selection.
Blyth, Mark. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Political Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter Two, Conclusions.
Hall, Peter A. The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations. In Lichbach, Mark and Zuckerman, Alan eds. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Culpepper, Pepper. Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990. World Politics 57,2: 173-209. 2005.
11 – Comparing Accounts of Institutions I (Crisis and Continuity in the Former Warsaw Pact Countries). April 5.
Shleifer and Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1999. Chapter selection.
Allio, Lorene et al. Post-Communist Privatization as a Test of Theories of Institutional Change. In Weimer, David L. ed. The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Bunce, Valerie. Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Collapse of Socialism and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Chapter Seven.
Appel, Hilary. The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case of Privatization. World Politics 52, 4:520-549.
12 – Comparing Accounts of Institutions II – The Origins and Consequences of International Human Rights Norms. April 12.
Finnemore, Martha J. Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, In Katzenstein, Peter J. ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. 1996.
Fioretos, Orfeo. Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. Unpublished Paper.
Moravcsik, Andrew. The Origin of Human Rights Regimes. International Organization 54,2:217-252. 2000.
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner. Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective. The Journal of Legal Studies 31:115-39. 2002.
13 – Competing Accounts of Institutions III – The Institutional Politics of Delegation. April 19.
Carpenter, Daniel. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy Networks in Executive Agencies. Conclusion: The Politics of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 2001.
Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004. Chapter selection.
Epstein, David, and O’Halloran, Sharyn. Asymmetric Information, Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11,1:35-56. 1999.
McCubbins, Mathew D. and Schwartz, Thomas. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28,1, 165-179. 1984.
14. Concluding Class – Studying Institutions in Practice.
Peter A. Hall. Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research. In Mahoney, James and Rueschmeyer, Dietrich eds. Comparative Historical Research in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Rosenthal, Howard and Voeten, Erik. Measuring Legal Systems. Unpublished Paper. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924175.
Farrell, Henry. Trust and Political Economy: Comparing the Effects of Institutions on Inter-Firm Cooperation. Comparative Political Studies, 38,5, 459-483. 2005.
[Discussion of students’ dissertation projects as appropriate]
